We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue-sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue-sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality-dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue-sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially to the level at which he sets the quality-dependent wholesale price in a one-to-one supply chain. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that our primary results are robust.
Introduction
Innovation is one of the key drivers in the creation of high-technology products such as the iPad and solar panels. These days, firms rely less on internal resources that they control directly.
Instead, more and more companies are purchasing components from suppliers who drive innovation to enhance the product quality. 1 For example, technology giant Apple buys components such as displays and CPUs from its suppliers, whose innovation significantly affects the performance of Apple's products such as the iPad. On Apple's procurement website, Apple signifies to its potential suppliers that their innovation is valuable to Apple. Recently, Apple's relationship with Samsung has been deteriorating; therefore, Samsung is not supplying displays for the iPad Mini. As a result, Apple has one display supplier, LGD, who has been Apple's supplier previously and one untested supplier, AUO, according to Cohan (2012) . It is important for Apple to motivate LGD and AUO to innovate in display technologies. Based on Ferrari (2012) , a supply chain technology executive, one significant challenge for Apple's supply chain is whether it can successfully foster the required new innovations in the display technologies of its display suppliers. Furthermore, one of the world's leading manufacturers of solar panels, First Solar, is currently facing a challenge with respect to how to motivate its upstream glass suppliers to invest more in innovation in order to increase the rated efficiency of its products and, thus, the selling price, of the end product. In summary, it is important for managers of manufacturers such as Apple and First Solar to understand the key drivers and incentives of upstream firms such as LGD and glass suppliers with respect to innovation in such supply chain settings.
Understanding the importance of upstream innovation, what can the downstream manufacturer do to motivate the upstream suppliers to invest more in innovation that will increase the downstream manufacturer's profit? First, they may consider alternative supply chain contracts, which leads to our first research question: Which contract form is most effective in motivating the upstream supplier to innovate, and which contract form helps to maximize the downstream manufacturer's profit? Second, the downstream manufacturer may invite competition between upstream suppliers to incentivize them to invest in innovation. Correspondingly, our second research question focuses on the impact of upstream competition on the upstream suppliers' incentives to innovate, and, in turn, on the downstream manufacturer's profit. Third, for some products such as the iPad, there exists a strong complementarity between upstream components, for example, between hardware and software. In this case, what is the impact of complementarity on upstream innovation and profits of firms within a supply chain? The second and third questions may help managers of downstream manufacturers to better understand the impact of the supply chain structure on innovation and profits.
When studying the impact of different contracts on innovation, we focus on three distinct contract forms: (i) the wholesale price contract, (ii) the quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) the revenue-sharing contract. We find that with the endogenous upstream supplier's innovation, the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the supply chain optimal innovation level, whereas the other two contract forms fail to coordinate the supply chain, and, especially, when the innovation cost is high, they perform quite badly. From the downstream manufacturer's point of view, however, the revenue-sharing contract does not always maximize his profit. Specifically, the revenue-sharing contract is the manufacturer's best choice (i.e., it maximizes the downstream manufacturer's profit) when other contract forms fail to effectively incentivize innovation (e.g., when innovation is relatively expensive). In contrast, when the innovation cost is low, the quality-dependent wholesale price contract maximizes his profit. If the downstream manufacturer chooses which contract form to employ in order to maximize his profit, then the supply chain decisions (the price, the quantity and the investment in innovation) are coordinated, and both the firm's profit and the consumer surplus is maximized. From the manufacturer's perspective, the quantity-dependent wholesale price contract dominates the wholesale price contract due to the fact that with the wholesale price contract the supplier chooses both the wholesale price and the quality, whereas in the quality-dependent wholesale price contract, the manufacturer effectively makes all the supply chain decisions. Examining the impact of upstream competition between suppliers, we show that under upstream competition, both the wholesale price contract and the quality-dependent wholesale price contract result in the same supply chain decisions and profits, which are also the same as those under upstream monopoly with the quality-dependent wholesale price contract. Moreover, we extend our model to analyze complementary suppliers, and confirm that our key results are robust in the presence of a complementary supplier.
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature: first, by studying endogenous upstream innovation, we contribute to the supply chain contract literature. We specifically demonstrate how supply chain contracts can coordinate the supply chain in order to achieve the optimal level of innovation by the upstream supplier in addition to the optimal production volume and pricing; we compare the effects of widely used contract forms in motivating the upstream supplier to invest in innovation, as well as the impact of those contract types on the downstream manufacturer's profit.
The existing supply chain contract literature has primarily focused on the production volume and pricing aspects of coordination, whereas this paper extends the supply chain contracts to include upstream innovation. 2 Studying different contract forms by taking upstream innovation investment into account, our results have an interesting managerial implication for First Solar's challenge; they indicate that the best contract form for First Solar depends on how costly it is for the upstream supplier to innovate. Specifically, if innovation is very expensive, the revenue-sharing contract is the best for the downstream manufacturer. However, if the innovation cost is low, the qualitydependent wholesale price contract serves the manufacturer better. Second, we analyze the impact of upstream competition with these contracts, and show that if the downstream manufacturer does not have adequate channel power to implement the qualitydependent wholesale price contract, inviting competing suppliers can have similar effects, even if the competing upstream suppliers set wholesale prices. This result provides an additional reason for managers of downstream manufacturers to have competing suppliers rather than an exclusive one, especially when simple wholesale price contracts are used in the supply chain. In this sense, upstream competition can serve as a substitute for the ability to choose the contract form for the downstream manufacturer. Finally, we also present the robustness of our key insights in cases with strong complementarity between the components of the final product.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 introduces the model and analyzes the three distinct contract forms. By comparing the performances of different contract forms, we provide our key analysis and the answers to our research questions in Section 4. Section 5 extends the model to include upstream competition for both substitutes and complements. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. All of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Literature Review
Our paper is related to the literature on supply chain contracts and coordination. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) discuss the problems in channel coordination as well as the mechanisms attempting to coordinate the channel, and derive the form of the quantity-discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits. Lal and Staelin (1984) discuss how and why a supplier should offer a discount-pricing structure, even if it does not alter the ultimate demand. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) explore the merits and limitations of the revenue-sharing contract. Wang et al. (2004) show that under a consignment contract with revenue-sharing, the overall channel profit and the retailer's profit depend on demand price elasticity and on the retailer's share of channel costs. Cachon (2003) provides an extensive review of the supply chain contract literature. Ozer and Raz (2011) analyze a supply chain structure with two competing suppliers and one manufacturer, focusing on asymmetric information. By examining how selling through a retailer affects an upstream manufacturer's decision regarding the product line compared to direct selling, Villas-Boas (1998) shows that when selling through a retailer, the manufacturer should increase the differences in the quality of the products in that line . Liu and Cui (2010) examine how a manufacturer designs the product line in centralized versus decentralized channels, and find that the product-line decision can be socially optimal in a decentralized channel, whereas it is never socially optimal in a centralized channel. Similar to these last two papers, we also study the product quality decisions in supply chains. However, the focus of our paper is the impact of supply chain contracts on investment in product innovations, which has been underexplored in the supply chain contract literature.
There are a few papers that investigate the supply chain coordination problem with endogenous innovation. Gupta and Loulou (1998) analyze the manufacturers' incentive in process innovation when selling through downstream retailers. Gilbert and Cvsa (2003) examine mechanisms that stimulate downstream innovation in a supply chain. They analyze the effect of price commitment by the upstream supplier. Adelman et al. (2011) also take the upstream firm's point of view. They address the question of when and how an upstream firm can encourage its customers to improve their products and charge customers a premium. Yao et al. (2011) turn their attention to the downstream buyers' problem in inducing suppliers to adopt new technologies. They consider a principal-agent problem and focus on unobservable adoption costs and investment. Zhu et al. (2007) study a buyer's effort in pushing investment in the quality control process of its supplier. Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009) examine revenue sharing, investment sharing and innovation sharing contracts in collaborating on new product development. They assume that the revenue is an exogenous linear function of the product quality without explicitly considering firms' pricing problems . Our paper differs by modeling consumers' decisions and taking firms' pricing decisions into account.
Besides the revenue-sharing contract, we also investigate the widely used wholesale price contract as well as the quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and show that these simple contracts may coordinate the supply chain under certain conditions. Furthermore, the quality-dependent wholesale price contract can be better for the downstream manufacturer than the revenue-sharing contract.
Our paper is also related to the literature in operations management on innovation and new product development, as reviewed extensively in Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) ; they focus on product innovation and development within a single firm. Ulku et al. (2005) In contrast to these and many other papers in this literature, we study a supply chain set-up and focus on the impact of supply chain contracts on an upstream supplier's innovations as well as the downstream manufacturer's profit.
Model
In this section, we consider a baseline supply chain structure with one upstream supplier who invests in innovation and sells through a downstream manufacturer. We utilize the horizontal product differentiation model (i.e., Hotelling 1929); specifically, consumers are uniformly distributed on a unit interval [0, 1] and the manufacturer owns one store located in the middle. Consumers have a per-unit traveling cost t. A consumer's utility is the product quality less her traveling cost and the product price. For example, if a consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] buys a product with quality Q at price p from the manufacturer, her net utility is u = Q − p − |x − 1 2 |t. A consumer needs at most one product and makes her purchase decision to maximize her net utility.
The timeline of our model is illustrated in Figure 1 . There are three stages. In the initial stage, s = 1, the supplier and the manufacturer sign the contract. We consider three different contract forms: (i) the supplier sets the wholesale price w and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the manufacturer; (ii) the manufacturer establishes a menu of wholesale prices, depending on the quality of the product, and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the supplier; 3 and (iii) the two parties employ a revenue-sharing contract in which the manufacturer first offers to share "a" portion of its revenue to the supplier, then the supplier decides on the wholesale price w. 4 In the second stage, s = 2, the supplier makes an innovation investment, which determines the product quality Q, and incurs the corresponding investment cost CQ 2 /2. The unit production cost c S for the supplier is increasing with this quality Q; specifically, c S = kQ with k > 0. Finally, in the last stage, s = 3, the manufacturer sets the product price and revenues are realized. The manufacturer also has a unit manufacturing cost (or unit selling cost for a retailer) c M .
3 If the supplier declines the offer, then she gets her reservation profit, which we normalize to zero. 4 If the supplier sets both the revenue share and the wholesale price, she can set a negative wholesale price equal (in absolute terms) to the manufacturer's unit manufacturing cost (reimburse the manufacturer his manufacturing cost) and ask for almost all of the revenue. By doing so, the supply chain is immediately coordinated, and the supplier is able to obtain the optimal supply chain profit.
The supplier and the manufacturer contract.
The supplier invests in innovation.
The manufacturer sets the product price and the revenue is realized.
Figure 1: The model timeline
To explore the impact of supply chain contracts on innovation, we first analyze a centralized supply chain case as our first-best benchmark in Section 3.1. We then consider the wholesale price contract, which is simple and widely used in practice (see., e.g., Cachon 2004) in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 explores the case in which the manufacturer sets the quality-dependent wholesale price contract. Finally, we present the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium under the revenue-sharing contract in Section 3.4.
The Centralized Supply Chain
Consider a centralized supply chain in which the pricing and innovation decisions are jointly made by a central planner, to maximize the total supply chain profit. This is the first-best case, and the total supply chain profit is maximized. We begin by analyzing consumers' choices. In stage 3, given innovation level Q, if the central planner charges a product price p > Q − t/2, the consumers located at both ends (0 and 1) get utility Q − t/2 − p < 0 by purchasing, so the market is partially covered, that is, only a fraction of consumers buy the product, and the total demand is 2(Q − p)/t.
However, if the central planner charges a price p ≤ Q − t/2, all customers obtain nonnegative utility by purchasing, so the market is fully covered, that is, all consumers purchase the product.
Therefore, the total supply chain profit can be written as:
2 , otherwise.
(1)
Solving this profit-maximization problem max p,Q π SC (p, Q), we obtain the first-best benchmark supply chain decisions and profit in the centralized supply chain, as presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the supply chain is centralized, the optimal supply chain decisions and profit are as follows:
This performance of the centralized supply chain serves as a first-best benchmark for analyzing and comparing the supply chain contracts used. We next analyze decentralized supply chains with three different contract forms.
The Wholesale Price Contract
We first look at the scenario in which the supplier sets the wholesale price. The wholesale price contract is widely used in industries. For example, manufacturers sell handheld power tools to retailers at wholesale prices (Luo et al. 2007) . To obtain the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium, we solve backwards. In stage 3, given the innovation level Q and the product price p, the consumer's problem is the same as that in the benchmark case. Considering the wholesale price w and consumers' decisions, we can write the manufacturer's pricing problem in stage 3 as follows:
Optimizing (2) over p, we obtain the optimal product price:
Anticipating that the manufacturer will set the product price as in (3), the supplier's corresponding profit in terms of the wholesale price and innovation level is
The supplier then sets the wholesale price w and the innovation level Q to maximize her profit in (4). After optimizing over the wholesale price w and the innovation level Q, we obtain the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium as presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the upstream supplier sets the wholesale price, the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are as follows:
When the supplier sets the wholesale price, the manufacturer still has the right to set the product price. As a result, the supplier cannot reap all of the supply chain profit.
Comparing the innovation level with that of the centralized supply chain, we can see that when the innovation cost is low, i.e., C ≤
, the supply chain optimal innovation level is achieved, because when the product quality is high, the manufacturer obtains a constant profit t/2, while the supplier enjoys all the additional benefit of improving the product quality. In other words, the supplier reaps all of the marginal benefit of innovation and is willing to innovate up to the first-best level. However, when innovation is relatively costly, i.e., C >
, the total supply chain profit is smaller. After giving the manufacturer his profit, innovation becomes unprofitable for the supplier; thus, she does not invest in innovation. In this case, the wholesale price contract does not coordinate the supply chain.
The Quality-dependent Wholesale Price Contract
We next explore the quality-dependent wholesale price contract. In some industries, the manufacturer may have specific requirements regarding the quality of the component and commit to buying components that satisfy these requirements at a wholesale price. For example, Apple may require its display supplier LGD to produce displays with a certain resolution or quality and quote a wholesale price for her displays contingent upon that resolution or quality level. With such a contract, the downstream manufacturer first offers the supplier a menu of wholesale prices w(Q) in stage 1. After observing this menu of prices, the supplier invests in innovation, which leads to a product quality Q * in stage 2. Finally, the manufacturer determines the retail price, and revenues are realized in stage 3. In order to obtain the equilibrium supply chain decisions and profits under this contract, we start analyzing backwards from stage 3; in this stage, given fixed w and Q (assuming w ≤ Q − c M , since otherwise the manufacturer will not be able to sell the product profitably), the manufacturer optimally sets the price p in order to maximize his profit:
Optimizing over p, we obtain
By plugging (6) into (5), the manufacturer's corresponding profit as a function of Q and w becomes
The supplier's profit in this case as a function of w and Q is:
Even though the manufacturer offers a menu of wholesale prices, he is effectively choosing a desired quality Q * and a corresponding wholesale price w * , since the manufacturer can offer a zero wholesale price for all other qualities to minimize the incentive for the supplier to deviate from Q * .
Consequently, the manufacturer's problem becomes what to choose for Q and w to maximize his own profit (7) subject to the constraint that the supplier's profit (8) is nonnegative. Moreover, this constraint should be binding, since otherwise the manufacturer can always offer a lower wholesale price w and increase his profit. Solving this constrained optimization problem, we obtain the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 3 With the quality-dependent wholesale price contract, the equilibrium decisions and profits are as follows:
, and w * = 1−k 2 2C , and the firms' profits are
At a first glance, one may expect the quality-dependent wholesale price contract to coordinate the supply chain and maximize the total supply chain profit, because all the supply chain decisions are effectively made by one party, i.e., the manufacturer. However, comparing the equilibrium product quality with that in the first-best case, we see that this quality-dependent wholesale price contract does not always coordinate the supply chain, despite the fact that the manufacturer effectively makes all the supply chain decisions, i.e., the quality level, the wholesale price and the product price. This is because the manufacturer can only reimburse the innovation cost to the supplier through a wholesale price rather than a lump sum transfer. As a result, the manufacturer has to set the wholesale price above the suppler's marginal production cost. Consequently, in the last stage when the manufacturer sets the product price, the double marginalization problem remains.
In other words, because the product price is set after firms sign the contract, the manufacturer cannot commit to a fixed consumer product price (and, thus commit to a fixed quantity sold) upfront to solve the problem of double marginalization.
The Revenue-sharing Contract
In the supply chain contract literature, the revenue-sharing contract is usually considered to be the contract that can coordinate the supply chain. Revenue-sharing contracts are also employed in certain industries. For example, the movie rental industry has been using revenue-sharing contracts for years. Apple also uses revenue-sharing contracts with its App developers, whose products significantly increase the value of Apple's products such as the iPad and the iPhone. In this section, we analyze the revenue-sharing contract with endogenous upstream innovation and examine whether it can coordinate the supply chain in such a setting.
From the downstream manufacturer's point of view, it is plausible to implement the revenuesharing contract before the supplier invests in innovation to encourage the supplier to invest more in innovation; specifically, in this contract, the downstream manufacturer first sets a, which is the fraction of his revenue that he will share with the supplier (stage s = 1). As a increases, the supplier obtains more revenue share, which then provides her with an incentive to invest more in innovation. After observing this fraction a, the supplier invests in innovation, and sets a wholesale price w (stage s = 2). Finally, the manufacturer sets the consumer product price and revenues are realized (stage s = 3).
To obtain the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium, we solve this game backwards, starting from stage 3, in which the manufacturer sets the product price, given the wholesale price w, the innovation level Q, and the supplier's revenue share a. The manufacturer's profit as a function of the price p can be written as:
Optimizing over p, we obtain the optimal product price:
The market is fully covered if w ≤ (Q−t)(1−a)−c M , whereas if w > (Q−t)(1−a)−c M , the market is partially covered, in which case the consumer demand is
. In stage 2, anticipating that the manufacturer will set his optimal price p as in (10), the supplier determines the optimal Q and w to maximize her own profit, which is
By optimizing (11) over w and Q, it follows that
There is a range of a over which the supply chain is coordinated. Specifically,
, for all a ∈ [0, 1], the supply chain is coordinated;
(ii) when
t ≤ a ≤ 1, then the supply chain is coordinated;
(iii) otherwise, for all a ∈ [0, 1], the supply chain is coordinated.
In addition, when
t < a < 1, then with these revenuesharing contracts, both the manufacturer and the supplier earn strictly larger profits than they would with the wholesale price contract. Consequently, comparing to the wholesale price contract, these revenue-sharing contracts yield a win-win scenario.
Finally, in stage 1, taking (12) into consideration, to maximize his profit, the manufacturer determines the optimal revenue share a for the supplier, which can be written as:
Then, the manufacturer's optimal a becomes (i) if
t < 1, then Q * = 0, and no revenue to share; hence, a does not matter;
Consequently, the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are as presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 With the revenue-sharing contract, the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are as follows:
, and a * = 0. In this case, the corresponding profits are
(ii) If
, and
Comparing the revenue-sharing contract case with the first-best centralized supply chain case, we notice that the revenue-sharing contract always coordinates the supply chain. When the innovation cost is relatively low
, the supplier has enough incentive to innovate by merely generating revenue through the wholesale price. The manufacturer does not need to provide additional incentives to the supplier by sharing his revenue. In this case, the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are the same as those when the supplier sets the wholesale price. When the innovation cost is intermediate
, as shown in Proposition 2, if the manufacturer does not share any revenue with the supplier, i.e., a = 0, then the supplier does not want to innovate. As a result, in order to provide an incentive for the supplier to innovate, the manufacturer gives a positive portion of his revenue to the supplier. However, the manufacturer shares the minimum portion needed and the supplier gets her reservation profit, which we normalize to zero. Finally, when innovation is so expensive that even in the first-best centralized case, the supply chain profit cannot be positive
, there is also no innovation in a decentralized supply chain with the revenue-sharing contract.
Impacts of Different Contracts on Innovation and Profits
We have analyzed a centralized supply chain, i.e., the first-best case, and decentralized supply chains with three different contracts. In this section, we compare their performances and answer our first research question: How do these different contract types impact the upstream innovation investment and firms' profits within a supply chain? The answer to this question can help address First Solar's recent challenge about how to motivate its glass supplier to invest more in innovation.
It also helps Apple to understand how to push its display supplier LGD to innovate better displays.
In the remainder of the paper, when comparing different contracts, we use superscripts to indicate the contract types. The centralized supply chain (the first-best benchmark), the revenue-sharing contract, the wholesale price contract, and the quality-dependent wholesale price contract are denoted as FB, RS, WP, and QD, respectively.
First, we explore the impact of different contracts on the innovation level in a supply chain and examine which contract form is more effective in motivating upstream innovation.
Proposition 5 The innovation levels under different contracts are:
(i) If C ≤ (1−k) 2 2(t+c M ) , then Q = 1−k C in
all four cases (the centralized case and the three contracts analyzed);
The above results suggest that when innovation cost is relatively low
) , all three contracts can achieve the supply chain optimal innovation level (the first-best benchmark level).
In this regime, the revenue-sharing contract is equivalent to the wholesale price contract, because the manufacturer does not share his revenue with the supplier. In contrast, when innovation is relatively costly
, only the revenue-sharing contract is able to achieve the supply chain optimal investment level in innovation. In other words, both the wholesale price contract and the quality-dependent wholesale price contract suffer from the double marginalization problem and, hence, cannot coordinate the supply chain. Therefore, if Apple or First Solar want to incentivize the upstream suppliers to invest more in innovation, the revenue-sharing contract is more effective than either the wholesale price contract or the quality-dependent wholesale price
Then, what is the consequence of pushing the upstream supplier's innovation on the downstream manufacturer's profit? Is he better off employing the revenue-sharing contract to provide a stronger innovation incentive to the upstream supplier? Interestingly, we find that while the revenue-sharing contract always coordinates the whole channel and maximizes the total supply chain profit, it is not always the best choice for the downstream manufacturer, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 6
The equilibrium manufacturer's profits with different contracts are:
First, in terms of maximizing the manufacturer's profit, there is no single contract form that dominates the other two in all cases. When the innovation cost is low
) , the quality-dependent wholesale price contract can effectively incentivize the supplier to innovate and also maximize the manufacturer's profit. In this case, the manufacturer extracts all of the supply chain profit, benefiting from its strong channel power, and the supplier receives only her reservation profit. In contrast, the revenue-sharing contract becomes equivalent to the wholesale price contract and the manufacturer is able to obtain only part of the total supply chain profit. These results suggest that when the innovation cost is low, it is important for the manufacturer to secure the right to set the quality-dependent wholesale price. If he can successfully keep the right to set the quality-dependent wholesale price, he can then capture the entire supply chain profit and leave the supplier her reservation profit.
However, if the quality-dependent wholesale price contract cannot achieve the supply chain optimal innovation level, which occurs when innovation is relatively costly
then the revenue-sharing contract is the manufacturer's best option. In this case, the manufacturer shares the minimum portion of revenue with the supplier and is able to reap all of the supply chain profit, leaving the supplier her reservation profit. These results suggest that when the innovation cost is relatively high, the manufacturer should be proactive and offer to share his revenue with the supplier. He can then leave the right to set the wholesale price to the supplier, and still reaps all of the supply chain profit and leave the supplier her reservation profit.
Our finding implies that in order to foster more innovation by LGD and at the same time obtain more profit, Apple should specify technological requirements for displays and set the corresponding wholesale price if LGD's innovation cost is low. Moreover, if LGD's innovation cost is relatively high, then Apple should use the revenue-sharing contract in its relationship with LGD.
It is also worth noting that if the manufacturer is able to choose his favorite contract form based on the innovation cost, the supply chain optimal innovation level is achieved under this optimal contract for the manufacturer. Furthermore, consumers benefit from this contract as well, as is shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Consumer surplus under different contracts is compared as follows:
Innovation improves the product quality and also benefits the consumers. Moreover, the consumer surplus is at least t/4, as long as the market is fully covered. In addition, because the manufacturer sets the consumer product prices optimally, the consumer surplus never exceeds t/4, and is optimized under the downstream manufacturer's optimal contract. This finding implies that if
First Solar sets the contract with its glass supplier optimally, then the consumer surplus is also maximized. Similarly, if Apple optimizes its contract with LGD, then consumers will also benefit.
Extensions: Upstream Competition

Substitute Suppliers
From the downstream manufacturer's point of view, given the supply chain structure, he can extract more profit by employing the appropriate contract form, i.e., either the revenue-sharing contract or the quality-dependent wholesale price contract, depending on the upstream supplier's innovation cost. However, the manufacturer may not be the one determining the contract form. In this case, it may still be possible for the manufacturer to invite competition between upstream suppliers.
Then, a natural question is: How does the upstream competition between suppliers affect the manufacturer's profit? In order to answer this question, we extend our model to a supply chain setting with two competing suppliers and one monopolistic manufacturer, similar to the supply chain structure explored in Ozer and Raz (2011) .
We start by investigating the wholesale price contract. In this setting, in stage 1, supplier 1 sets her wholesale price w 1 and determines her innovation effort Q 1 . Then, in stage 2, the competing supplier, supplier 2, sets her wholesale price w 2 and decides on the quality of her product Q 2 . 6
Finally, observing the wholesale prices and product qualities offered by those two suppliers, the manufacturer decides the prices of the products, and revenues are realized.
In this case, we first derive the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Under upstream competition, if the upstream suppliers set the wholesale prices, the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are the same as those with the quality-dependent wholesale price contract under upstream monopoly, which are as follows:
, and firms' profits are
With the wholesale price contract, upstream competition strengthens the monopolistic manufacturer's channel power. In order to compete for the manufacturer's order, supplier 1 has to offer a better deal to the manufacturer than that offered by a monopolistic supplier. If suppler 2 can offer a product with quality Q 2 at a wholesale price w 2 , which is more attractive to the manufacturer than supplier 1's offering, and still make a profit, then supplier 2 will choose to do so, and the manufacturer will buy only from supplier 2. In this case, supplier 1 will not be able to recover her innovation cost. Therefore, in equilibrium, supplier 1 offers Q 1 and w 1 such that the manufacturer's profit as given in (7) is maximized subject to the constraint that her own profit as given in (8) is nonnegative. This constraint optimization problem is the same as the one faced by the manufacturer with the quality-dependent wholesale price contract under upstream monopoly in choosing the quality Q and the wholesale price w. As a result, the manufacturer becomes as if he sets the quality-dependent wholesale price under upstream monopoly. That is, the existence of supplier 2 forces supplier 1 to relinquish more profit to the monopolistic manufacturer. Hence, the upstream competition can be considered to be a substitute for the quality-dependent wholesale price contract from the manufacturer's point of view.
We next consider the quality-dependent wholesale price contract under upstream competition. The supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are the same as those under upstream monopoly, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Under upstream competition, with the quality-dependent wholesale price contract, the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are the same as those under upstream monopoly:
When the manufacturer sets the quality-dependent wholesale price, he effectively decides both qualities and wholesale prices subject to the constraints that the suppliers make nonnegative profits.
The manufacturer is able to extract all of the profit in the supply chain and leave suppliers their reservation profits.
Upstream competition may increase the manufacturer's channel power. However, with the quality-dependent wholesale price contract, he already has strong channel power; thus, inviting upstream competition does not do much to strengthen his power. Based on the results above, the right to set the quality-dependent wholesale price and the upstream competition have the same effect on the manufacturer's profit. Specifically, if the manufacturer does not have adequate strong channel power to set the quality-dependent wholesale price, inviting competing suppliers helps to increase his channel power as well as his profit.
However, under upstream competition, neither the wholesale price contract nor the qualitydependent wholesale price contract coordinates the supply chain when innovation is relatively costly.
But what is the case in the revenue-sharing contract? Does it coordinate the supply chain as well as maximize the manufacturer's profit under upstream competition? We answer this question in the following proposition:
Proposition 10 Under upstream competition, the revenue-sharing contract achieves the supply chain optimal first-best innovation level and maximizes the manufacturer's profit. The supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are:
, and a 1 = 0. In this case, the corresponding profits are
Under upstream monopoly, the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain. However, it may not maximize the downstream manufacturer's profit. Proposition 10 finds that under upstream competition, the revenue-sharing contract not only coordinates the supply chain, but also maximizes the manufacturer's profit. When the innovation cost is low
, the manufacturer does not give any revenue to the supplier, and the revenue-sharing contract is effectively the same as the wholesale price contract. In this case, the existence of supplier 2 precludes supplier 1 from charging a high wholesale price and enables the manufacturer to receive all of the supply chain profit and to leave suppliers with only their reservation profits. When the innovation cost is relatively high
, the manufacturer can maximize his profit even without upstream competition. Therefore, the existence of a competing supplier does not help the manufacturer further. Finally, if the innovation cost is so high
that even a centralized supply chain cannot make a positive profit, then there is certainly no innovation in a decentralized supply chain. This result suggests that First Solar should consider inviting competition between glass suppliers and employing the revenue-sharing contract. By doing so, First Solar would be able to provide its glass suppliers with enough incentive to innovate, and also to increase his own profit.
Complementary Components Suppliers
For some products, e.g., the iPad, there exists strong complementarity between the components of the products, e.g., between hardware and software. In this section, we extend our model to capture this complementarity and investigate the impact of the complementarity on innovation and profits.
In this setting, there are two suppliers innovating and then producing complementary components. Let e i (i = 1, 2) be supplier i's innovation effort. We assume the corresponding innovation cost to be Ce 2 i /2. The quality of the final product Q depends on both suppliers' innovation efforts; specifically, Q = √ e 1 e 2 . Similar to our base model, the manufacturer sets the product price, and the horizontal product differentiation model is employed to model the consumer demand. To simplify our analysis, we assume k = 0 and c M = 0, and focus on the wholesale price contract and the quality-dependent wholesale price contract in analyzing the case of complementary components suppliers.
We start by analyzing a centralized supply chain, i.e., the first-best case, which serves as our benchmark. The optimal supply chain decisions and profits for this benchmark are presented in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11 With complementary components suppliers, if the supply chain is centralized, then
the optimal supply chain decisions and profits are:
In a centralized supply chain, innovation is conducted in the most cost effective way, that is, the total innovation cost is minimized in achieving the product quality Q. Moreover, when the innovation cost is too high, i.e., C > 1 2t , then there is no product innovation in a centralized supply chain.
We then examine a decentralized supply chain with the wholesale price contract and present the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium in the following proposition:
Proposition 12 With complementary components suppliers, the supply chain decisions and profits
in equilibrium under the wholesale price contract are as follows:
When the innovation cost is low, because the suppliers set the wholesale prices, they reap the marginal profit of more innovation efforts and leave the manufacturer a constant profit. The manufacturer still receives a positive profit because he determines the retail price of the final product and can always add a margin on top of the wholesale prices. But when innovation is relatively costly, even though it is optimal for the entire supply chain to invest in innovation, the wholesale price contract cannot provide enough incentive for the suppliers to make innovation investments.
Next, we study the quality-dependent wholesale price contract with complementary components suppliers.
Proposition 13 With complementary components suppliers, the supply chain decisions and profits
in equilibrium under the quality-dependent wholesale price contract are as follows:
In this case, even though the manufacturer is effectively making all supply chain decisions, the supply chain is still not always coordinated due to the double marginalization problem.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes in Propositions 12 and 13 with the first-best benchmark case in Proposition 11, we observe that neither the wholesale price contract nor the qualitydependent wholesale price contract always coordinates the supply chain. Rather, they may result in underinvestment in innovation even under complementary components suppliers. This observation demonstrates the robustness of our previous results on the characteristics of these contracts without upstream competition. Furthermore, when the quality-dependent wholesale price contract can achieve the supply chain optimal innovation investment levels, the manufacturer reaps all the supply chain profit and leaves the suppliers with their reservation profits. This observation with complementarity is also consistent with our result in the case of one upstream supplier.
Concluding Remarks
We study three widely used contract forms in a supply chain with endogenous upstream innovation. We demonstrate that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, whereas the wholesale price contract and the quality-dependent wholesale price contract may or may not coordinate the supply chain. A downstream manufacturer prefers the revenue-sharing contract when the quality-dependent wholesale price contract does not coordinate the supply chain, and prefers the quality-dependent wholesale price contract otherwise. We extend our model to include competing suppliers and show that inviting upstream competition under the wholesale price contract has a similar effect to employing the quality-dependent wholesale price contract. We also analyze the wholesale price contract and the quality-dependent wholesale price contract with complementary components suppliers and show that our results are robust.
Our findings provide some guidance to managers of downstream manufacturers on ways to encourage their suppliers to invest more in innovation, and simultaneously reap more profit. For example, from the perspective of First Solar, increasing the efficiency (the rate at which the semiconductor cell converts energy from radiation into electricity) is critical for keeping its products competitive on the market, since higher efficiency reduces the cost per watt. First Solar currently has the lowest cost in the industry, producing thin-film solar panels for 73 cents a watt. 7 However, in order to compete with fossil fuels without government aid, it needs to increase its efficiency even further, which requires its glass supplier to invest more in innovation. Our paper suggests that if innovation is relatively costly, First Solar should consider implementing the revenue-sharing contract with his glass supplier before she innovates, whereas if innovation cost is low, First Solar should consider offering a quality-dependent wholesale price contract to the supplier or invite competition between glass suppliers.
We focus on the impact of contracts on upstream innovation in a supply chain in this paper.
However, in some cases, the manufacturer can also invest to improve the quality of the product.
Incorporating the downstream product innovation decision as well as the upstream investment decision in innovation can engender several new interesting research questions. However, these are beyond the scope of our paper, and we leave them for future research.
In conclusion, innovation is a key competency for many firms operating in high-tech industries and novel product industries. Our work helps in understanding the impact of various supply chain contracts on encouraging innovation as well as on downstream firms' profits. We hope that our study will stimulate new avenues of research on supply chain contracts and product innovation in supply chains.
7 It has also developed a cell that converts 17.3% of solar energy into electricity, which may yield a conversion rate of 15.3% if applied in mass production, which would be a record efficiency for a thin-film solar cell (Martin 2011) .
Proof of Proposition 8:
We first prove that there is no equilibrium where both suppliers are able to sell positive quantities. Suppose not. Then as shown in Lemma A.1, it must be the case that Q 1 − p 1 = Q 2 − p 2 . Depending on the wholesale prices, there are two possible alternatives:
1. w 1 ̸ = w 2 . Without loss of generality, we assume w 1 > w 2 . The manufacturer then can strictly increase his profit by selling only the more profitable product, i.e., product 1. Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium.
2. w 1 = w 2 . Denote the total demands for the two products as q 1 and q 2 respectively. Note that w 1 > kQ 1 to insure that supplier 1 has nonnegative profit. Let δ = q 2 (w 1 −kQ 1 ) 2(q 1 +q 2 ) . If supplier 1 chooses the wholesale price w ′ 1 = w 1 − δ, instead of w 1 , the manufacturer will sell only product 1 at a price no larger than the original price, i.e., p
is, supplier 1 can obtain more profit. Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium, either.
Consequently, in equilibrium, only one supplier invests in innovation and the manufacturer sells one product only. As the two suppliers are symmetric, the wholesale price and quality offered by supplier 1 must optimize the manufacturer's profit as given in (7) subject to the constraint that her profit as given in (8) is nonnegative. Otherwise, supplier 2 could offer a better deal to attract the manufacturer and gets positive profit. As a result, the supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium in this setting are the same as those under a quality-dependent wholesale price set by the manufacturer with upstream monopoly.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Suppose that in equilibrium, both suppliers make positive investments in innovation. Then both products must be sold at positive quantities so that both suppliers make nonnegative profits; that is, q 1 > 0, and q 2 > 0. Based on Lemma A.1, we have
Without loss of generality, assume that product 1 is more profitable for the manufacturer, i.e.,
Because consumers have the same preference over the two products, if the manufacturer sells only product 1 with quality Q 1 at price p 1 , the total quantity sold will be the same; that is, the new demand for product 1 is q ′ 1 = q 1 + q 2 > q 1 . The manufacturer can offer a new wholesale price w ′ 1 (Q 1 ) =
2 , i.e., supplier 1's profit remains the same.
Therefore, the manufacturer can offer supplier 1 a lower wholesale price to incentivize her to invest in innovation (note that supplier 1's profit remains the same) and make more profit. Hence, there is at most one supplier making positive investment innovation in equilibrium. The supply chain decisions and profits in equilibrium are the same as that under upstream monopoly.
Proof of Proposition 10:
, then by setting a equal to zero, the manufacturer can make the contracts effectively the same as wholesale price contracts set by the suppliers. As shown in Proposition 8, the manufacturer obtains the supply chain optimal profit. This is the best outcome for the manufacturer, and thus in equilibrium, he sets a = 0 and the outcomes are the same as those presented in Proposition 8. If Lemma A.2 The optimal way to achieve quality Q is to set e 1 = e 2 = Q, and the minimum cost c(Q) is CQ 2 .
Proof. For all (e 1 , e 2 ) such that √ e 1 e 2 = Q, we have the total innovation cost C 2 (e 2 1 + e 2 2 ) ≥ Ce 1 e 2 = CQ 2 , with the inequality being equal if and only if e 1 = e 2 = Q.
A.4
The total gross profit (not including innovation costs) of the supply chain is fully specified by the product price p and quality Q. Therefore, the profit maximization problem is to choose (Q, p) to maximize the difference between the total gross profit and the minimum innovation cost c(Q).
Then the total supply chain profit can be derived similar to equation (1). Solving this optimization problem, we obtain the results, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12:
Similar to the monopoly supplier case, we first derive supplier 1's profit as a function of her wholesale price w 1 and innovation effort e 1 . (A.5) Supplier 2's profit function is similar. We claim that any equilibria with positive product quality must satisfy w 1 + w 2 = √ e 1 e 2 − t.
(i) If w 1 < √ e 1 e 2 − t − w 2 , then supplier 1 can increase w 1 to increase her profit. Thus this cannot happen in equilibrium.
(ii) If √ e 1 e 2 − t < w 1 + w 2 < √ e 1 e 2 , then the first order conditions must be satisfied. By solving the first order conditions for both suppliers, we have e 1 = e 2 = w 1 = w 2 = 0, which falls out of the region. Therefore, there is no equilibrium in this region.
(iii) If w 1 + w 2 ≥ √ e 1 e 2 , then the only equilibrium is e 1 = e 2 = 0.
We then use the necessary conditions to derive the outcomes of possible equilibrium with a positive product quality. Plugging w 1 (e 1 ; w 2 , e 2 ) = √ e 1 e 2 − t − w 2 into (A.5), we obtain π S1 (w 1 (e 1 ; w 2 , e 2 ), e 1 ; w 2 , e 2 ) = ) for all (w 1 , e 1 ), which confirms that this is indeed an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 13:
Let π M (w, Q) be the manufacturer's profit under the optimal product price given the total wholesale price (w = w 1 + w 2 ) and the quality of the final product. Let π Si (w i , e i ) be supplier i's profit given w i and e i . Then the manufacturer needs to choose (w i , e i ), i ∈ {1, 2} to maximize π M (w 1 + w 2 , √ e 1 e 2 ) subject to the constraints that π Si (w i , e i ) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
Denote this constrained maximization problem and its optimal value as CM and V , respectively.
Let π S (w, Q) be the total of suppliers' profits given the total wholesale price and the quality (assuming that the suppliers minimize their total innovation cost). Let CM ′ be the optimization problem of choosing w and Q to maximize π M (w, Q) subject to the constraint π S (w, Q) ≥ 0 and let V ′ be the corresponding optimal value. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, one can solve For any (w, Q) that satisfies π S (w, Q) ≥ 0, we have w 1 = w 2 =
